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This paper shows that the effects of employment protection critically depend on its 
enforcement. For this purpose, we capture evasion of employment protection via market exit 
in a setting of monopolistic competition. We find that the number of firms entering the market 
depends on firing costs only in the case of imperfect enforcement of employment protection. 
Furthermore, the possibility to circumvent firing restrictions by exiting the market mitigates 
the adverse efficiency effects of employment protection and can reverse the sign of the 
change in employment associated with an increase in firing costs. 
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To gain a proper understanding of the eﬀects of regulations and other interventions by
public authorities, it is necessary to include possibilities to circumvent such rules into the
analysis. To give an example in line with this, a voluminous literature has developed inves-
tigating the eﬀects of tax evasion, starting with the seminal contribution by Allingham and
Sandmo (1972). Labor markets, especially in continental Europe, are often characterized
by substantial regulations. In this paper, our focus is on employment protection legislation.
Employment protection restricts the employer’s freedom to reduce the workforce of her ﬁrm
or at least increases costs for such a downward adjustment. In most of the literature on
employment protection, it is (implicitly) assumed that the corresponding regulations can be
perfectly enforced. However, this may not always be warranted. As employment protection
is normally associated with costs for the employer, an incentive exists to circumvent these
regulations. Furthermore, as employment protection rules intervene with the employer’s de-
cisions in the event of downward adjustments in employment, they restrain the employer’s
freedom of choice when the ﬁrm faces unfavorable business conditions. Therefore, the em-
ployer may simply not be able to aﬀord the expenses associated with these regulations. Thus,
evasion should be taken into account when assessing the presumed eﬀects of employment
protection legislation.
In this paper, we capture limited enforceability of employment protection legislation
by allowing ﬁrms to avoid payment of ﬁring costs by leaving the market. Market exit
costs can fall short of individual ﬁring costs. First, it may be that ﬁrms cannot aﬀord
the required payments as they do not earn any proﬁt. Second, in the case of market exit,
incentives to default on ﬁring costs may be enhanced, because penalties cannot be imposed
(see, e.g., Belviso 2003). To incorporate the market exit decision meaningfully, we use a
partial equilibrium model of imperfect competition on product markets, allowing for an
endogenous number of competitors. We choose a model of monopolistic competition in the
manner of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), enriched by ﬁring costs and demand shocks.1 As in
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), we allow for market power of ﬁrms to depend on the number
1Other contributions investigating employment protection in models of monopolistic competition are Am-
able and Gatti (2006), Bertola (1994), and Burda (1991), all of which, however, assume perfect enforcement
of ﬁring costs.
2of ﬁrms in the market. We assume idiosyncratic shocks, such that ﬁrms are homogeneous
ex-ante but heterogeneous ex-post as in Melitz (2003). Consequently, a threshold for market
exit of single ﬁrms can be derived. The reason for market exit being a proﬁtable strategy is
that ﬁring costs add a ﬁxed-costs component to ﬁrms proﬁts, which the ﬁrm can save on by
leaving the market.
We ﬁnd that, ﬁring costs are neutral with respect to market entry in the case of perfect
enforcement. This no longer holds if evasion of ﬁring costs is allowed for and market power of
ﬁrms depends on the number of ﬁrms active in the market. In this case, positive ﬁring costs
increase the number of ﬁrms entering the market. However, due to market exit, the number
of ﬁrms active is always lower for positive ﬁring costs than for zero ﬁring costs if evasion
of ﬁring costs by market exit is possible. For our results on hirings, dismissals, and total
employment we rely on a simulation. We ﬁnd that the possibility to evade ﬁring costs by
market exit mitigates the eﬀects of employment protection on hirings and dismissals. Con-
cerning employment, we establish that the possibility to circumvent ﬁring costs by market
exit can reverse the sign of the change in employment when ﬁring costs are increased. A
ﬁnal observation is that, as employment protection reduces eﬃciency in the present set-up
by assumption, the possibility to evade ﬁring costs actually attenuates the adverse eﬃciency
eﬀects of ﬁring costs in the market equilibrium.
Our ﬁndings can be related to real-world observations. Blanchard and Portugal (2001),
comparing the labor markets in the USA and Portugal, conclude that in Portugal, a country
with stringent employment protection rules, a much higher share of labor market ﬂows is
accounted for by market entry and exit of ﬁrms than in the USA, a country characterized
by limited job security regulations. Using these ﬁndings to evaluate the results in our paper,
we conclude that taking account of only limited enforcement of employment protection rules
in the case of market exit is important for a proper assessment of their real eﬀects.
Literature. Although most contributions on employment protection assume perfect
enforcement, some authors allow for noncompliance with existing rules. The paper nearest to
our analysis is Samaniego (2006). Using a neoclassical general equilibrium model, Samaniego
investigates the consequences of limited enforcement of employment protection rules, which,
as in the model presented here, is due to non-enforcement of ﬁring costs in the event of market
exit. Market exit is driven by ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks in ﬁxed costs. Samaniego calibrates his
3model on the basis of data for the USA. Without the evasion of ﬁring costs by market exit,
ﬁring costs reduce labor reallocation due to less variability in employment per ﬁrm as well as
lower market entry and exit rates. In contrast, with the evasion of ﬁring costs, job creation
and job destruction due to market entry and exit is higher for positive ﬁring costs and ﬁrms
are less reluctant in hiring workers. The results presented in this paper are in line with the
results found by Samaniego, except that in our analysis the eﬀect on market entry is less
pronounced. At the expense of a less detailed model environment, the set-up used in this
paper allows for some additional insights with respect to the market entry decision and the
eﬃciency eﬀects of ﬁring costs.
Other contributions which allow for limited enforcement of employment protection rules
due to limited assets of ﬁrms are Belviso (2003) and Blanchard and Tirole (2004). Belviso
(2003) investigates a search- and matching model with severance payments and ﬁring costs,
but allows ﬁrms to declare bankruptcy in the occurrence of a negative shock, where bankruptcy
frees ﬁrms from their obligations. As a consequence of the assumption of each ﬁrm employ-
ing only one worker, ﬁrms always declare bankruptcy if realizing low productivity, and ﬁring
costs only aﬀect wage bargaining, whereas they have no direct eﬀect on the decision to dis-
miss an employee. Blanchard and Tirole (2004) discuss optimal ﬁring taxes for ﬁnancing
unemployment beneﬁts and consider ”shallow pockets” of ﬁrms as an additional constraint
for the optimization problem of the benevolent planner. This necessitates a decrease in op-
timal ﬁring taxes because otherwise, as results in the model presented here, ﬁrms are driven
out of the market.2
There can be other reasons for limited enforceability of employment protection regula-
tions not related to limited assets or market exit. See, for instance, Martin et al. (2004) or
Galdon-Sanchez and G¨ uell (2003) on asymmetric information and Blanchard and Landier
(2002) or Neugart and Storrie (2006) on ﬁxed-term employment contracts or the use of tem-
porary work agency employment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the model is described. Section
2The possibility of limited assets of ﬁrms hampering enforcement of employment protection is also men-
tioned by Boeri (1999). Outside the realm of labor economics, the topic of limited assets impeding the
enforcement of legal rules has been in particular discussed in the context of tort law. An early contribution
in this line is Shavell (1986).
43 investigates the eﬀects ﬁring costs exert on the equilibrium. As the model does not allow
for a closed-form solution, we present a simulation in Section 4 to provide further insights.
Section 5 concludes this study.
2 The model
2.1 Description
We investigate a model with a continuum of goods produced and consumed. In this section,
we ﬁrst derive the demand functions for the goods produced. Subsequently, we describe the
production sector. The equilibrium is derived in Section 2.2.
Demand. In the economy, the representative consumer’s preferences are given by a
CES-utility function over a continuum of diﬀerentiated consumption goods, indexed by j,
j ∈ [0, ¯ n],
U =







where xj is the amount of good j consumed and α ∈ (0,1) equals the inverse of the
elasticity of substitution between goods. As in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) the value of
α may depend on the number of competitors active in the market, n, with α′(n) ≤ 0.3 The
elasticity of substitution may increase in the number of varieties produced as a higher number
of varieties abates the diﬀerentiation between products, and therefore eases substitution
between goods for consumers. The higher the elasticity of substitution between goods, the
lower the market power of each single ﬁrm is. The number of varieties of the consumption
good for which a blueprint exists is depicted by ¯ n and determined by market entry decisions
of ﬁrms in the production sector, where each ﬁrm is able to produce one variety of the
consumption good. As market exit is allowed for, the number of ﬁrms active in the market
can diﬀer from the number of blueprints available, n ≤ ¯ n. Furthermore, aj is a stochastic
preference parameter which is distributed in the interval [0,a], a > 0, according to the twice
diﬀerentiable cumulative distribution function G(aj), which is the same for every commodity
j. The corresponding density function is labeled g(aj). The realizations of the preference
3See also, e.g., Ebell and Haefke (2003).
5parameters are mutually independent. With Y as total spending on consumption goods,








where pi is the price of commodity i and
Ω =












is a measure for eﬀective output of consumption goods. The last equality sign in equation
(3) follows from the common distribution of the preference parameter for all commodities
j. Residual demand for ﬁrm i is higher, the lower the value of eﬀective output Ω and the
higher the own preference parameter ai or total spending Y are.
Production sector. The production sector is characterized by monopolistic competition
on goods markets. A continuum of ﬁrms exists, with the mass (number) of ﬁrms, ¯ n, being
determined by free market entry. Each ﬁrm is endowed with a blueprint to produce one
variety of the consumption good and uses the same production technology with labor as
the only input. Each worker employed produces one unit of the commodity. We restrict






















Period 1 Period 2
Figure 1: Time structure of the model
4We neglect discounting between periods for notational convenience.
6As in Melitz (2003), we investigate a setting in which ﬁrms are homogenous ex-ante (pe-
riod 1) but heterogenous ex-post (period 2). The realization of the demand parameter is not
revealed before the beginning of the second period (stage (2.1)). At the beginning of period
1, ﬁrms decide whether to enter the market, stage (1.1), which involves the development of a
new blueprint for a variety of the consumption good. Entry is associated with ﬁxed market
entry costs C, which are sunk. For production to take place in period 2, ﬁrms have to hire
and train workers in period 1 (stage (1.2)), determining the number of initially employed
workers per ﬁrm ¯ xi. The consideration underlying this assumption is that workers need ﬁrm-
speciﬁc knowledge for production, and training to be time-consuming. Training costs are
given as h per worker. The decisions with respect to market entry and hiring are therefore
made knowing only the distribution of the preference parameter a. After the realization
of the demand parameters for the commodities at the beginning of period 2, each ﬁrm can
decide whether to stay or to exit the market, stage (2.2). Firms that stay in the market may
adjust their employment level at stage (2.3). However, as a consequence of time-consuming
training, only a downward adjustment of initial employment is possible. Costs per worker
employed in period 2 are given by the wage w, taken as exogenous, whereas the ﬁrm has
to pay ﬁring costs T < w for each worker laid oﬀ.5 To illustrate the eﬀects of limited en-
forcement of employment protection rules, we distinguish two scenarios with respect to the
market exit decision. In scenario A, which serves the purpose of a benchmark scenario, mar-
ket exit does not allow for a saving on ﬁring costs. Market exit corresponds to employment
of zero in period 2 and accordingly market exit costs are given by T¯ xi. In this case, market
exit is never a proﬁtable strategy. In scenario B, in the event of market exit, employment
protection rules cannot be enforced and market exit costs equal zero. Consequently, all ﬁrms
that would otherwise incur losses close down.
2.2 Equilibrium
The model is solved by backward induction. We start with the decision on employment in
period 2 of a ﬁrm staying in the market (stage (2.3)), determine market exit decisions (stage
(2.2)), describe the optimal hiring policy (stage (1.2)) and ﬁnally point out the number of
5We assume ﬁring costs T to fall short of the wage w as otherwise dismissals other than associated with
market exit would never take place. Nevertheless higher ﬁring costs could be allowed for, although this
would not yield any new insights.
7ﬁrms entering the market (stage (1.1)). As ﬁrms can be readily described by the realization
of the respective demand parameter ai in period 2 and are symmetric in period 1, in what
follows we leave out the subscript for ﬁrms.
Adjustment of employment. Firms that stay in the market in period 2 decide whether
to keep employment at the level of initial hirings ¯ x or to lay oﬀ some of their employees.
In choosing employment, ﬁrms maximize proﬁts in period 2, π(a), subject to the constraint
x(a) ≤ ¯ x. Proﬁts in period 2 are given by





1−α − (w − T)x(a) − T¯ x. (4)
Firing costs change the cost structure of ﬁrms because eﬀective marginal costs of out-
put/employment, (w − T), decline in ﬁring costs whereas a ﬁxed cost component, T¯ x, is
added. From maximization of proﬁts in period 2, one ﬁnds a threshold value for the pref-
erence parameter a, ak, such that optimal employment is restricted by initial hirings ¯ x for
a > ak, whereas a ﬁrm that stays in the market lays oﬀ part of its workforce for lower values























1−α ; a ≤ ak
¯ x; aY
Ω ¯ x−α; a > ak.
(6)
Market exit. A ﬁrm leaves the market if maximized proﬁts in period 2 fall short of
market exit costs. As marginal proﬁts become inﬁnite for employment approaching zero and
therefore would exceed the wage payment w, market exit (that is zero employment) can only
be proﬁtable if it allows for a saving on the ﬁxed costs component in period 2. Accordingly,
in scenario A, market exit is never a proﬁtable strategy as it does not allow for a saving on
ﬁring costs, ab
A = 0. In contrast, in scenario B, one ﬁnds a second threshold for the demand
parameter, ab





= 0 and ﬁrms which realize a preference parameter
8a < ab
B exit the market. Inserting equation (6) into equation (4), ab














Y ¯ xα; T ≤ αw
w Ω
Y ¯ xα; T > αw.
(7)
The threshold value for market exit increases in eﬀective output Ω as residual demand for
each single ﬁrm decreases. Furthermore, ab
B increases in initial employment ¯ x because of
the higher ﬁxed costs. Finally, with respect to ﬁring costs, the threshold value ab
B equals
zero for zero ﬁring costs (T = 0) but is positive for positive values of ﬁring costs. Ceteris
paribus, the threshold value increases with ﬁring costs for T < αw to reach a maximum at
T = αw. The critical value for ﬁring costs, αw, is due to the fact that individual dismissals
cannot be proﬁtable for higher values of ﬁring costs, as the optimal price in the case of a
downward adjustment in employment,
w−T
1−α , would fall short of production costs per unit
output, given by the wage w. Accordingly, ﬁrms either exit the market or stay active while
keeping employment at ¯ x, but never lay oﬀ workers individually in the case of T > αw.6 As
a consequence, a further increase in ﬁring costs does not aﬀect proﬁts of the ﬁrm any longer,
and the threshold value ab
B is solely determined by a comparison of the price the ﬁrm can






as the probability of exit for each ﬁrm, the number of ﬁrms in the market in







, with l = A,B, denoting the scenario under consideration.
Taking the option of market exit into account, proﬁts in period 2 are described by
π(a) =

   
   











α − T¯ x; ab
l < a ≤ ak
aY
Ω ¯ x1−α − w¯ x; a > ak,
(8)
l = A,B. In scenario B, for T > αw, ak < ab
B and proﬁts in period 2 are described by the
ﬁrst and the last line in equation (8) only, with ak being replaced by ab
B.
Initial employment. In period 1, each ﬁrm must decide about the number of workers
to hire, ¯ x. Firms choose initial employment in order to maximize the ex-ante expected proﬁts
6Note that for T = αw, the two threshold values for the preference parameter coincide, ak = ab
B.




π(a)dG(a) − h¯ x. (9)

























− h = 0, (10)
l = A,B, for scenario A and for scenario B if T < αw. For T > αw in scenario B, ak has to
be replaced by ab
B and the actual level of ﬁring costs does not aﬀect the number of workers
to hire. Equation (10) states that, in equilibrium, the ﬁrst term, namely expected marginal
revenue of the last worker hired, equals marginal costs. Beside training costs h, the latter
comprise either the wage w in case the (last) worker remains employed after the realization
of the preference parameter (a ≥ ak) or ﬁring costs T in the event of an individual dismissal
(ab
l < a < ak). In the event of market exit in scenario B, ﬁring costs are reduced to zero.
In what follows, we assume the second-order condition for a proﬁt maximum to be fulﬁlled,



















is assumed to hold. 7
Market entry. Firms enter the market as long as ex-ante expected proﬁts, Π, exceed
the market entry costs C. Integrating equation (8), subtracting training costs and taking
into account the ﬁrst-order condition for initial employment, equation (10), the market entry





for both scenarios A and B. The number of ﬁrms entering the market is determined by overall
demand Y , the elasticity of individual demand α, also indicating market power of ﬁrms, and
entry costs C. The number of ﬁrms entering the market increases with total spending and
7Marginal revenues decrease as initial employment increases, however, marginal costs decrease in scenario
B for T < αw as well. Marginal costs decrease because higher initial employment increases the ﬁxed costs
component and thereby raises the probability of market exit, in which case ﬁring costs are saved. Equation
(11) states that the decrease in marginal revenue more than oﬀsets the decrease in marginal costs when
initial employment is increased.
8For calculations see Appendix A.
10market power per ﬁrm, and decreases with market entry costs.
Equilibrium. The equilibrium of the economy is deﬁned by the system of equations
(3), (5), (6), (7), (10), and (12) determining the endogenous variables
• ¯ n, the number of ﬁrms entering the market,
• ak and ab
l, l = A,B, identifying the two critical values of the preference parameter,
• ¯ x, the number of initial hirings in period 1 per ﬁrm,
• the optimal employment rule in period 2, x∗(a), and
• the value of eﬀective output Ω.
The number of ﬁrms entering the market, ¯ n, together with the threshold value for market
exit, ab








3 The eﬀects of ﬁring costs
Market entry and the number of competitors in the market. Analyzing the impact
ﬁring costs exert on the number of ﬁrms that initially enter the market, ¯ n, one can distinguish
four cases, speciﬁed by whether market exit allows for a saving on ﬁring costs (scenario A
versus scenario B) and whether the (absolute) elasticity of demand for each single ﬁrm, 1/α,
is constant or increases in the number of ﬁrms active in the market, n.
First, if the elasticity of demand for each ﬁrm is independent of the number of ﬁrms
in the market, α′(n) = 0, the number of ﬁrms entering the market, ¯ n, is independent of
the existence or the level of ﬁring costs in both scenarios A and B. From the market entry
condition, equation (12), this number is solely determined by the exogenous parameters for
entry costs, C, total spending, Y and the constant value of α.
In contrast, if the elasticity of demand increases in the number of varieties actually
produced in period 2, α′(n) < 0, the results diﬀer according to the scenario considered.
For scenario A, without the possibility to circumvent ﬁring costs by market exit, no market
exit takes place. The number of ﬁrms active in period 2 always coincides with the number
of ﬁrms entering the market in period 1, n = ¯ n. Therefore, the market entry condition,
11equation (12), still determines the number of ﬁrms entering the market independently of the
existence or the level of ﬁring costs according to
α(¯ n)
¯ n = C
Y .9 Otherwise, with evasion of ﬁring
costs by market exit, scenario B, from equation (7) the threshold value for market exit, ab
B is
positive for T > 0 and zero for T = 0. For positive ﬁring costs the number of ﬁrms active in








n = ¯ n holds for T = 0. Accordingly, the value of α would be higher for T > 0 than for
T = 0 if the number of ﬁrms entering the market were the same. With ¯ nT=0 (¯ nT>0) denoting
the equilibrium number of ﬁrms entering in the case of zero (positive) ﬁring costs, ex-ante
expected proﬁts would exceed market entry costs if T > 0 and ¯ nT>0 = ¯ nT=0 were to hold.
This implies that additional ﬁrms enter the market, resulting in ¯ nT>0 > ¯ nT=0.
These results can be explained as follows: For scenario A, in equilibrium, the increase
in labor (adjustment) costs is just oﬀset by a decrease in overall eﬀective output and the
accompanying increase in residual demand per ﬁrm, leaving ex-ante expected proﬁts un-
changed for a given number of ﬁrms entering the market. This also holds true for the case
involving the evasion of ﬁring costs by market exit, if the elasticity of substitution does not
depend on the number of ﬁrms in the market. However, if the elasticity of demand increases
with the number of varieties, an additional eﬀect of ﬁring costs comes into play. Market
exit by some ﬁrms increases market power for the remaining ﬁrms. Proﬁts of the remaining
ﬁrms and therefore ex-ante expected proﬁts increase. This leads to more ﬁrms entering the
market until the market entry condition is reestablished.
Next, let us turn to the number of ﬁrms active in period 2, n. For scenario A, as no market
exit takes place, this number always coincides with the number of ﬁrms entering the market.
In contrast, in scenario B, for a positive level of ﬁring costs some ﬁrms leave the market
after the revelation of the preference parameters, such that nT>0 < ¯ nT>0. Furthermore, the
number of ﬁrms active in period 2 is always lower for a positive level of ﬁring costs than for
the case of no ﬁring costs in scenario B. Whereas this is obvious for α′(n) = 0 as ¯ nT>0 = ¯ nT=0
in this case, this also holds for α′(n) < 0. To see this, assume nT>0 ≥ nT=0 = ¯ nT=0. This









α′(¯ n)¯ n − α(¯ n)
¯ n2 < 0
and therefore the number of ﬁrms entering the market ¯ n is unique.
12equal to or fall short of ¯ nT=0 to assure equality in equation (12), contrary to what has been
established above.
The ﬁndings for market entry and the number of ﬁrms active in period 2 are described
in Table 1 and summarized in Result 1.
α′(n) = 0 α′(n) < 0
Scenario A nT≥0 = ¯ nT≥0 = ¯ nT=0 nT≥0 = ¯ nT≥0 = ¯ nT=0
Scenario B nT>0 < nT=0 = ¯ nT≥0 = ¯ nT=0 nT>0 < nT=0 = ¯ nT=0 < ¯ nT>0
Table 1: Market entry and number of ﬁrms active in period 2
Result 1: Assuming market power of ﬁrms to decrease with the number of ﬁrms active
in the market in period 2, α′(n) < 0, and allowing for evasion of ﬁring costs by market
exit (scenario B), more ﬁrms enter the market for positive ﬁring costs than in the absence
of ﬁring costs. In contrast, if evasion of ﬁring costs is not possible (scenario A) or market
power of ﬁrms is independent of the number of competitors, α′(n) = 0, the number of ﬁrms
entering the market is independent of the existence or the level of ﬁring costs. Finally, in
scenario B, for positive ﬁring costs the number of ﬁrms active in period 2 is always lower
than for zero ﬁring costs.
In the following, for reasons of tractability, we restrict the analysis to the case α′(n) = 0,
that is market power of ﬁrms is exogenous and as a result the number of ﬁrms entering the
market is always independent of the level of ﬁring costs.
Eﬀective output and utility of the representative consumer. Firing costs rep-
resent additional labor costs for ﬁrms. To reestablish the market entry condition after an
increase in ﬁring costs, these higher costs must be compensated by higher proﬁts resulting
from a shift in residual demand faced by each single ﬁrm. This must be achieved by a
decrease in eﬀective output Ω, see equation (2). Indeed, with ex-ante proﬁts, Π, equal to















[¯ x − x
∗(a)]dG(a) ≤ 0, (13)
13l = A,B. The integral term is the number of expected dismissals and corresponds to the
direct eﬀect ﬁring costs have on ex-ante expected proﬁts, ∂Π
∂T.10 Eﬀective output decreases
with ﬁring costs and only in scenario B for T ≥ αw, Ω will no longer be aﬀected by a further
increase in ﬁring costs as no individual dismissals take place. Moreover, as can be deduced
from equation (1) in conjunction with equation (3), the representative consumer’s utility
unambiguously depends positively on eﬀective output for a given elasticity of substitution
α−1.
Result 2: Eﬀective output generally decreases in ﬁring costs. Only if evasion of ﬁring
costs by market exit is possible and no individual dismissals take place (T ≥ αw), a further
increase in ﬁring costs leaves eﬀective output unaﬀected. The decline in eﬀective output
translates into a reduced utility level for the representative consumer in equilibrium.
Market exit and initial employment. Before turning to the simulation in the next
section, we report the results of the comparative static analysis with respect to initial em-
ployment, ¯ x, and the threshold value for market exit, ab
B in scenario B.11 For the change in







































































¯ xα < 0. (15)
∆ < 0 holds according to the assumption of the second-order condition for a maximum of
proﬁts being fulﬁlled, see equation (11). The direct eﬀect of ﬁring costs is to increase the
threshold value ab
B. However, this eﬀect may be counteracted by the reduction in eﬀective
output Ω or a decrease in initial employment ¯ x. The reduction in eﬀective output implies an
increase in residual demand and proﬁts of ﬁrms, whereas a decrease in initial employment
would lower the ﬁxed costs component of proﬁts in period 2. In scenario A (ab
A = 0) or
10This follows from an application of Hotelling’s Lemma.
11The calculations can be retraced in Appendix B.
14for ﬁring costs exceeding αw in scenario B an increase in ﬁring costs has no eﬀect on the
probability of market exit.
































l = A,B. The direct eﬀect of ﬁring costs is to increase marginal costs of labor according to










, reducing the optimal number
of workers to hire. However, an increase in the probability of market exit would diminish
marginal costs and the decrease in eﬀective output increases marginal revenue, which both
raise initial employment. These two eﬀects are indicated by the second and third term in
equation (16). From equation (16), whether initial employment increases or decreases with
ﬁring costs in scenario B cannot be predicted. In contrast, in scenario A, initial employ-
ment always decreases in ﬁring costs. In this case, from equations (3) and (6), as optimal
employment in period 2 increases with ﬁring costs for all a < ak, the decrease in eﬀective
output Ω can only be achieved by a decrease in employment for a > ak, that is lower initial
employment ¯ x.12
4 Simulation
The purpose of the simulation is, ﬁrst, to exemplify the change in initial employment and the
probability of market exit, for which no unambiguous results are found in the comparative
static analysis. Furthermore, this section investigates the number of dismissals and overall
employment in period 2 as well as eﬀective output to allow for a comparison between the
scenarios with perfect and limited enforcement of employment protection regulations.
Parameter values and functions used for the simulation. The parameter values
and functions used are summarized in Table 2.
For the preference parameter a, we assume a uniform distribution in the interval [0,10]
as indicated by G(a) in Table 2. The wage w serves as a numeraire. Hiring costs amount to
20 per cent of wages. The parameter values for market entry costs C and overall spending
12Note that ab











Table 2: Parameter values and functions used in the simulation
Y only aﬀect the absolute values of the outcomes.
Probability of market exit/Number of ﬁrms. As stated in Result 1, for α being
independent of the number of active ﬁrms, the number of ﬁrms that initially enter the
market ¯ n does not depend on ﬁring costs. In contrast, the number of ﬁrms active in period





, and therefore on the threshold value for
the demand parameter ab
l, l = A,B. In the comparative static analysis no clear cut results
could be derived for the change of ab
l with respect to ﬁring costs for scenario B. In Figure 2
we report the number of ﬁrms active, n, as a share of ¯ n. The number of ﬁrms entering the
market equals ¯ n = 50. The horizontal axis gives ﬁring costs as a percentage share of wages.
The dashed line depicts the share of ﬁrms still active in period 2 if no evasion of ﬁring costs
is possible, scenario A, in which case no market exit takes place (n/¯ n = 1). In contrast,





, is represented by the solid
line. In scenario B, an increase in ﬁring costs always raises the probability of market exit in
the simulations until the critical value of T = αw = 0.5 is reached, that is the direct eﬀect
of ﬁring costs to increase the threshold for market exit always dominates in the simulation.
The number of ﬁrms active for T = 0.5 equals n = 36.689 implying a probability of market
exit of 24.62 per cent. For ﬁring costs higher than the critical value, a further increase has
no additional eﬀect on the probability of market exit.
Initial employment. Figure 3 depicts the number of workers hired in period 1, ¯ x, as
a share of initial hirings in the absence of ﬁring costs, ¯ xT=0, for the two scenarios A and B.
Again the horizontal axis corresponds to the ratio of ﬁring costs to wages. Without ﬁring
costs, initial employment per ﬁrm amounts to ¯ xT=0 = 2.375. The dashed (solid) line gives
16T/w
n/¯ n
Figure 2: Active ﬁrms in period 2
initial hirings for scenario A (B). For T < 0.5 in the simulations, initial hirings also decrease
in ﬁring costs in scenario B. This means that the direct increase in labor (adjustment) costs
dominates the two indirect eﬀects of a reduction in labor costs due to a higher probability of
market exit in scenario B and the increase in marginal revenue due to lower eﬀective output
of competing ﬁrms. However, the eﬀect of an increase in ﬁring costs on initial hirings is
mitigated when possibilities of evasion are taken into account.
T/w
¯ x/¯ xT=0
Figure 3: Employment in period 1
Dismissals. The number of dismissals in period 2 is given by
D = ¯ n
  a
0
(¯ x − x
∗(a))dG(a)










(¯ x − x
∗(a))dG(a) (17)
17l = A,B. As illustrated in the second line of equation (17), the number of dismissals can
be broken down into dismissals due to market exit, the ﬁrst term, and individual dismissals
by ﬁrms that stay in the market in period 2, the second term. There are three diﬀerent
ways in which ﬁring costs alter the number of dismissals. First, for ﬁrms active in period
2, labor demand increases for low levels of the demand parameter a due to the decrease in
eﬀective marginal costs. Additionally, optimal employment in this case is also aﬀected by the
change in eﬀective output Ω. The decrease in eﬀective output, Ω, further increases optimal
employment due to the increase in residual demand. Second, as shown above, initial hirings
decrease in ﬁring costs in the simulation for every scenario. These two eﬀects translate into
fewer dismissals taking place. However, there is a countervailing third eﬀect if market exit
allows for evasion of ﬁring costs. The increase in the probability of market exit, associated
with employment of zero in period 2, ceteris paribus raises the number of dismissals taking
place in scenario B. In the simulations presented in this section, the ﬁrst two eﬀects dominate
the third eﬀect in scenario B, that is the number of dismissals is found to decrease with ﬁring
costs, see Figure 4. The dashed (solid) line gives the number of dismissals relative to the
number of dismissals for T = 0, denoted DT=0, for scenario A (B). As can be seen, the
possibility to evade ﬁring costs also dampens the eﬀect ﬁring costs exert on the number of




Employment in period 2. The number of workers hired in period 1 together with the
18decision on dismissals determine employment in period 2, denoted X, where





As both the number of workers hired as well as the number of workers dismissed generally
decrease with ﬁring costs in the simulations, the sign of the change in employment is at ﬁrst
ambiguous. Figure 5 contains the outcomes for employment in period 2 as a share of employ-
ment for T = 0, XT=0. The lines are drawn with the same conventions applied in the other
ﬁgures with the solid (dashed) line representing the outcome in scenario B (A). Most strik-
ingly, the ﬁgure conveys that the possibility to evade ﬁring costs by market exit can actually
alter the sign of the change in employment when ﬁring costs are increased. For scenario
A, starting from low ﬁring costs, an increase in ﬁring costs reduces employment. However,
starting from high levels of ﬁring costs, the outcome is reversed and actual employment
eventually exceeds employment for zero ﬁring costs.In contrast for scenario B, employment
decreases in ﬁring costs only for very low levels of ﬁring costs but afterwards increases in
ﬁring costs until reaching a maximum for T = αw. In the simulations, employment is higher
in scenario A than in scenario B only for high values of ﬁring costs. Note however, that
a higher employment level is not directly associated with a more eﬃcient allocation as the
representative consumer’s utility depends on eﬀective output.
T/w
X/XT=0
Figure 5: Employment in period 2
Eﬀective output. As has been already established in Result 2, an increase in ﬁring
costs is associated with a decrease in eﬀective output as long as individual dismissals take
place. In contrast to employment in period 2, for the calculation of eﬀective output, employ-
19ment is weighted by the respective realizations of the demand parameter and manipulated
according to the elasticity of substitution between goods (see equation (3)). As illustrated
in Figure 6, we ﬁnd in the simulations that the possibility to evade ﬁring costs mitigates the
negative eﬀect of ﬁring costs on eﬀective output. Again, the solid line depicts scenario B,
whereas the dashed line represents the outcome in scenario A without market exit.
As the utility level achieved by the representative consumer is positively related to eﬀec-
tive output (see Result 2), the possibility to circumvent employment protection is associated
with a gain in eﬃciency in the model. However, one should note that in the setting used,
there is no justiﬁcation for the existence of employment protection rules. Nevertheless, the
outcomes depicted in Figure 6 point to the interesting fact that the reduction in eﬃcient
output cannot be primarily addressed to market exit taking place. Eﬀective output is even
higher in scenario B with market exit than in scenario A where no market exit takes place.
T/w
Ω/ΩT=0
Figure 6: Eﬀective output
5 Conclusion
The impact of labor market regulations depends on their enforcement. In this paper, we
capture limited enforceability of employment protection legislation by allowing ﬁrms to cir-
cumvent regulations by market exit. Market exit may allow for evasion of ﬁring costs either
because ﬁrms are simply not able to pay the additional costs or because they have an in-
centive to default on their obligations in the event of market exit. If market power of ﬁrms
depends on the number of ﬁrms active in the market, the number of ﬁrms initially entering
20the market is higher for positive ﬁring costs than in the absence of ﬁring costs. However,
accounting for market exit, the reverse holds true for the number of ﬁrms actually taking up
production. In the setup used and for given market power of ﬁrms, ﬁring costs always re-
duce eﬃciency of the market equilibrium measured in terms of the representative consumer’s
utility. Using a simulation approach, we show that the negative eﬀects of ﬁring costs on eﬃ-
ciency can be mitigated if evasion of ﬁring costs by market exit is allowed for. Furthermore,
the possibility to circumvent ﬁring costs can reverse the sign of the change in employment
when ﬁring costs are increased.
21Appendix
A Derivation of equation (12)
Assume that T ≤ αw or that evasion of ﬁring costs is not possible. Ex-ante expected proﬁts
less hiring costs are given by equation (9). Using equation (8) in conjunction with (6), noting
that for a < ab

































− h¯ x. (19)
Multiplying the ﬁrst-order condition for initial employment, equation (10), with ¯ x and sub-

























Recognizing the deﬁnition of Ω in equation (3), equation (20) can be directly transformed
to equation (12) in the main text. For T > αw in scenario B, the market entry condition
can be derived in a similar manner.
B Comparative static analysis - Derivation of equa-
tions (14) and (16)
From equations (5), (7), (10) and assuming α′ = 0, we formulate the following system for
the respective changes in the values of ak, ab


















































































































































l and d¯ x = 1
α¯ x1−αd¯ xα the last two equations can be
transformed into the equations (14) and (16) in the main text.
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Additional Appendix
Derivation of equation (2)
The representative consumer maximizes utility U by choosing the consumption quantities
xj subject to her budget constraint. The respective Lagrangian is given by
L =














with λ as the Lagrange multiplier. This yields the ﬁrst-order conditions for the most preferred








i + λpi = 0 (A2)
for all i ∈ [0, ¯ n]. Multiplying equation (A2) with xi, integrating the outcome over the
varieties of the consumption good and solving for the Lagrange multiplier λ, one gets
λ = −







Inserting equation (A3) into equation (A2) one obtains equation (2) in the main text.
Derivation of equation (13)
From the proﬁt equation, equation (4), and for optimal employment x∗(a) the partial deriva-














26Integrating these terms and recognizing the deﬁnition of Ω, equation (3), the change in

























l = A,B, yielding equation (13).
The simulation approach
The outcomes of the simulations are derived in the following way. First, we deﬁne an auxiliary
variable, φ = Ω
Y ¯ xα. Using this deﬁnition, we are able to solve for the three variables ak, ab
l,
l = A,B, and φ by use of the two threshold values for the preference parameter and the
ﬁrst-order condition for initial employment, equations (5), (7), and (10). Next, using the
deﬁnition of φ, the period 2 proﬁt function, equation (8), can be rewritten as
π(a) =

   
   



























l < a ≤ ak
aY





¯ x; a > ak.
(C1)
l = A,B. Accordingly, ex-ante expected proﬁts, deﬁned in equation (9), are linear in initial
employment ¯ x, for the calculated values of ab
l, ak, and φ. Integrating equation (C1) and
subtracting hiring costs h¯ x, one can state ex-ante expected proﬁts as a function Π = F¯ x,
with F being a constant. From the market entry condition, Π = C, this allows us to calculate
initial employment as ¯ x =
C
F and eﬀective output as Ω =
φY
¯ xα . Optimal employment in period
2, x∗(a), then follows from equation (6). Finally, expected employment in period 2, X, equals





whereas the number of dismissals, D, is given by
D = ¯ n¯ x − X. (C3)
13Note that in equilibrium ∂Π










∂ak = 0, l = A,B.
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